Can “the people” be feminists? Analysing the fate of feminist justice claims in populist grassroots movements in the United States by Emejulu, Akwugo
Interface: a journal for and about social movements Article 
Volume 3 (2): 123 - 151 (November 2011)                        Emejulu, Can “the people” be feminists? 
 
  123 
Can “the people” be feminists? Analysing the fate of 
feminist justice claims in populist grassroots 




In this article I examine the fate of feminist justice claims in the context of 
grassroots populist movements in the United States. By exploring populism on 
the left—in neighbourhood community organising—and on the right—within 
the community organising among the Tea Party—I argue that a “politics of 
authenticity” is deployed in each movement with strikingly similar effects on 
the development of feminist consciousness and justice claims in each 
movement.  In left-wing community organising I find that feminist claims are 
suppressed in order to preserve solidarity among grassroots actors and to be 
perceived by movement outsiders as patriotic. On the right I demonstrate how 
women-centric practices are generated through the strategic use of an identity 
I label “concerned motherhood”. For the Tea Party, women appear to have the 
ability to identify as women for local action but this process seems to threaten 
both feminism and democracy by women’s support for a politics of inequality. 
I conclude with a discussion about whether feminism and populism can be 
reconciled and the perils that confront feminist activists in the current upsurge 




In the United States, community organising activists typically legitimise their 
practices in urban grassroots movements by adopting populist principles. For 
both left-wing and right-wing groups, populism is deployed to spotlight 
political, cultural and economic elites who, populists claim, are undermining 
and distorting the will of “the people”. For populist claims-making to be 
successful, activists must discursively construct and reinforce adversarial 
identities and relations between “us” and “them”: the “authentic” and virtuous 
public versus the selfish and out-of-touch elite. Through these discursive 
practices, community organising activists argue that popular solidarity across a 
range of potentially divisive identities such as class, “race” and gender is built 
and sustained and as a result, groups can be effectively organised and mobilised 
for actions that will benefit the majority.  
In this article, I compare the claims-making and framing strategies by which 
right and left wing community activists construct some citizens’ claims as                                                         
1 I would like to thank Lesley Wood, Catherine Eschle and the two anonymous reviewers for 
Interface for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
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authentic expressions of “the people” whilst other claims are labelled as divisive 
or partisan and are thus silenced from the dominant community organising 
discursive repertoire. In particular, I chart the fate of feminist justice claims—
articulations and practices that seek to transform hegemonic gender roles, in 
order to “end sexist oppression” and encourage women to organise as women to 
advance equality and justice (hooks 2000: 18). Understanding what happens to 
feminist claims and practices within community organising politics is important 
because women are typically the key activists in these grassroots urban 
movements. As Cynthia Cockburn (1979) and Nancy Naples (1997) note, 
because of women’s location in the private spaces of the family and community 
they have an intimate connection to the local state through their experiences of 
local social welfare services. “Women experience themselves and are expected 
by others, to be the prime caretakers of families, neighbourhoods and 
communities—and are the ones especially placed to make demands for their 
protection” (Ackelsberg 2001: 409). Thus, exploring how community organising 
ideas and practices shape women’s understandings of their identity, gender 
consciousness and the nature of the inequalities they experience is crucial to 
understanding how grassroots populist politics influence and legitimise the 
available space for certain forms of identity and activism.  
I begin my analysis with a short discussion of populism and how this idea is 
operationalised in US-based democratic politics. Following Iris Marion Young 
(1997: 400), by “democratic politics” I mean “a process where citizens aim to 
promote their interests knowing that others are doing the same…It is also a 
method for determining the best and most just solution to conflicts and other 
collective problems”. I will then move on to explore the formation and structure 
of populist discourses and identities in both left-wing and right-wing grassroots 
movements2. On the left, I examine the language and practices of the so-called 
“New Populist” neighbourhood movement that came to prominence in the early 
1980s and still exerts a strong influence on contemporary progressive 
community organising today (Boyte 1980; Boyte and Reismann 1986; Kling and 
Posner 1990; Fisher 1994; Leavitt 2003; Kleidman 2004; Martin 2010; Atlas 
2010). On the right, I analyse the language and practices of the Tea Party 
movement. Self-consciously modelled on populist left-wing community 
organising, the Tea Party is the most high profile counter-movement against                                                         
2I use the terms “left-wing” and “right-wing” as broad political categories that encompass a 
range of ideas and social practices. I do not mean to imply that contemporary political thought 
reflects a simplistic one-dimensional spectrum of political ideas or that the boundaries between 
right and left are so easily identified. Nevertheless, in the community organising tradition, these 
labels are infused with meaning and convey important ideas about authentic grassroots practice. 
By “left-wing” I include those political ideologies and practices that seek social justice in the 
form of the redistribution of wealth from rich to poor and the recognition difference in terms of 
identities among various groups (Young 1990 and Fraser 1997). By “right-wing” I include those 
political ideologies and practices that seek to preserve the status quo in terms of economic and 
social hierarchies, oppose state-based remedies for economic and social inequalities and seek to 
use the state to defend and expand traditional morality and values (Klatch 1988 and Diamond 
1995). 
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Barack Obama’s Keynesian fiscal policies (Lepore 2010; Lilla 2010; Zernike 
2010). In comparing these two populist movements, I do not wish to imply that 
these movements are unproblematically unified, coherent and homogenous. 
Indeed, what is compelling about the “New Populist” neighbourhood movement 
of the 1980s and the Tea Party of today is that in spite of their disparate and 
fractured characteristics, they have managed to articulate a fairly clear vision 
about the common good and mobilise new groups of actors who would not 
normally participate in community or electoral politics (Boyte 1980; Boyte and 
Evans 1986; Lepore 2010; Zernicke 2010).  Through my comparative analysis I 
also do not want to convey that I am comparing like with like. The purpose and 
ambitions of the New Populists and the Tea Party are very different, but what 
binds them together is the strikingly similar ways in which they adopt and 
practice populist politics in the US context—and the complementary ways in 
which they systematically silence feminist claims from their discursive 
repertories. 
For both the left-wing and right-wing populist groups, I will explore how the 
subject position of “the people” is constituted and how particular policy 
preferences are articulated and legitimised by grassroots practices. I will also be 
analysing how gender claims are constructed in these discursive landscapes and 
discuss the implications this has for our understandings of authenticity. I will 
conclude with a discussion about whether feminism and populism can be 
reconciled in grassroots movements. Before I turn to explore populism in more 
depth, I want to first briefly outline my discursive research methods. 
 
Analysing populist discourses 
Post-structuralist discourse analysis is concerned with understanding the 
construction and reproduction of identity within particular discourses through 
the analysis of talk and texts. Post-structuralism asserts that language’s primary 
function is not to necessarily to describe reality but to ascribe meanings and 
value-systems about our identities and relationships (Derrida 1974; Foucault 
1980; Laclau and Mouffe 2001). Words are not simply instrumental ways in 
which to communicate; they insert themselves between us and reality so that 
they convey specific cultural knowledge and “truths” which discipline us to 
think, feel and behave in specific ways.   
Following Hansen (2006), I have adopted post-structuralist discourse analysis 
(PDA) approach to analysing texts, discourses and identities in this article. It is 
important to note that PDA does not seek to “uncover” hidden truth claims in 
texts. Instead, the focus is on mapping the formation and structure of discourses 
in relation to significant historical events and investigating how these discourses 
simultaneously open up and close down particular identities for individuals and 
groups at particular moments in time.  In terms of grassroots populism in the 
US, the salient historical moment that typically sparks populist action is an 
economic crisis (Boyte and Evans 1986; Kazin 1998a). It is no surprise then that 
left-wing populism is revived by the energy crisis recession of the late 1970s 
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whilst the Tea Party is organised in the context of the global banking crisis in 
2008.  These politically significant moments in time set the boundaries of the 
constitution of grievances, the nature of solidarity within groups and the 
available identities for mobilisation.  
Hansen (2006: 82-6) argues that rigorous text selection and analysis is the 
linchpin for valid and reliable PDA research. She proposes a clear set of criteria 
for the selection of texts for analysis. In terms of general criteria, she states that 
all texts selected should have a “clear articulation of identities”, “be widely read” 
within the field and should have the “formal authority to define a political 
position” (Hansen 2006: 85). Realistically, however, not all texts selected for 
analysis are able to fulfil all three criteria and thus should meet at least one of 
the criteria and be balanced by the selection of other texts that fulfil the rest of 
the criteria. Hansen (2006: 82-5) then suggests three further characteristics 
texts should have for selection. Firstly the majority of texts selected for analysis 
should be from the time periods under study. Secondly, primary texts such as 
books, newspaper articles and speeches directly related to the topic should be 
given priority for analysis however secondary texts such as academic work 
should be included in order to understand the social, political and historical 
context of the discourse and identity. Finally, to supplement the texts directly 
related to the topic, conceptual history texts should also be included in order to 
show how discourses and identities have interacted and changed over time.  
I analysed populist discourses through an iterative method of reading a variety 
of relevant texts in order to understand how the patterns in the language of 
populist grassroots movements constitute the nature of their grievances, the 
structure of solidarity, their policy preferences and their social practices for the 
organisation and mobilisation of subjects. My selection of texts of community 
organising in the US spans two different time periods. For the New Populist 
neighbourhood movement, I analysed texts published from 1979 to 1995 and 
this textual selection was supplemented by a number of more recent texts 
published in the 2000s to demonstrate the continuity of various discursive 
practices in left-wing populism. For the Tea Party, my text selection spans from 
2008, when the Tea Party was first constituted, to the time of writing in 2011.  
Due to the recent establishment of the Tea Party, a comprehensive body of 
literature analysing its ideas and practices does not as yet exist. However, I have 
attempted to select texts about the movement that seek to understand it in 
relation to history, social change and individual biography—as C. Wright Mills 
(1959) suggests social scientists should approach the sociological analysis of 
phenomena. I have defined “texts” as books, academic, newspaper and 
magazine articles and speeches that constitute the discourses of populist 
community organising. Based on Hansen’s method of text selection, these texts 
have been chosen for analysis based on their clear articulations of discourse and 
identity (they represent various schools of thought with regard to populist 
community organising), they are cited widely by other texts (in terms of 
intertextuality and the linking of texts through extensive citations and the use of 
interpellation and catchphrases) and they provide a mixture of “official” 
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discourses (in terms of hegemonic conceptualisations) and oppositional 
discourses (in terms of re-framing dominant definitions, processes and events). 
In addition, these texts are a mixture of primary, secondary and conceptual 
history sources. 
By understanding the ways in which populist discourses construct the terms of 
their politics, it is possible to analyse the identity formations they generate. The 
final part of my discourse analysis is to trace how populist groups define 
themselves and who they include in their sense of self and, in contrast, how they 
define “the other” and who they exclude from their idea of an authentic self. In 
terms of policy preferences and identity constructions, I focus particularly on 
how populists legitimise their claims as authentic and the impact this has on 
other competing identities and claims—especially in terms of feminist justice.  
An important critique of a discourse analysis methodology is that “anything 
goes” in terms of the quality and rigour of analysis offered (Parker and Burman 
1993; Antaki et al 2002). An on-going problem with discourse analysis is that 
mere presentation, quotation or summary of texts is not sufficient in providing a 
rigorous, systematic, rational, compelling and persuasive analysis. Critics argue 
that: 
The analytic rush to identify discourses in order to get on with the more serious 
business of accounting for their political significance may be partly responsible 
for the tendency…to impute the presence of a discourse to a piece of text without 
explaining the basis for specific claims (Widdicombe 1995, quoted in Antaki et al 
2002: 12). 
Discourse analysis can often privilege circular logic whereby the selective 
presentation of texts is used to illustrate patterns in the discourse which in turn 
justify the existence of discourse in texts. The goal of this article is not to simply 
identify and analyse discourses and identities and then hold forth about their 
importance and influence on populist community organising. Instead, I wish to 
understand the significance of how these discourses and identities interact with 
and perhaps displace oppositional feminist claims and practices. Thus the focus 
of my analysis is not simply to argue for the existence of a particular discourse 
but to explore how the language and practice of populism disciplines social 
actors in particular ways—ways that undermine a transformational feminist 
politics of social justice.  
With my methodology and methods explained, I will now move on to discuss 
the idea of populism in further detail.  
 
Populism as strategy—not ideology  
Populism is notoriously difficult to define. “We simply do not have anything like 
a theory of populism, or even coherent criteria for deciding when political actors 
have turned populist in some meaningful sense” (Mueller 2011: 1, emphasis in 
original text). Sometimes populism is used as a short-hand for dismissing overly 
simplistic political analyses and policy proposals. Other times it is deployed as a 
synonym for nativism or totalitarian tendencies in democratic politics. For the 
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purposes of this paper, I am interested in what populism might mean in the 
context of democratic politics in the United States. Margaret Canovan (1999: 3) 
defines populism as the “appeal to “the people” against both the established 
structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society”. She 
argues that populism is a three-pronged concept: it is an articulation of popular 
grievances, a unifying call to the sovereign people and a challenge to perceived 
elite power and influence.  
Firstly, populism is an articulation of ordinary people’s feelings of disrespect 
and exclusion from the operation of political, economic and cultural power in 
society. There is a sense that the everyday ideas and traditions of local people 
are being ignored or disregarded and as a result, the health and future of the 
country is imperilled by the practice of elite power. What is important to note 
here about the articulation of grievances is the explicit link that is made between 
“ordinary people” and authentic uses of power. If power is wielded in ways that 
unnecessarily challenge popular belief systems or undermine the “will” of the 
people, then this power is seen as dangerous and illegitimate.  
Secondly, populism is a call to arms for ordinary people. The people are 
constructed as united and virtuous because of their shared values and beliefs. 
Because the people are grounded in local institutions and traditions, they are 
typically the guardians of real politics that serve majority interests. Thus “the 
people” claim popular sovereignty and stewardship of the nation because it is 
their values, beliefs and institutions that provide the nation with a true sense of 
itself through authentic expressions of the popular will.  
Finally, populism is a revolt against elite power. Canovan (1999) argues that the 
idea of “elites” should be understood broadly: populists are challenging elites in 
politics (especially those in mainline political parties), economics (the super-
rich and corporate bosses) and culture (cosmopolitan metropolitans, academics 
and the media class). Elites are seen as disconnected from and contemptuous of 
ordinary people and their traditions. Because of their lack of grounding in 
workaday life, elites represent dangerous partisan interests that threaten 
popular sovereignty. Thus, political, economic and cultural elites have to be 
dislodged from power because they actively seek to distort and undermine the 
will of the majority. 
What is important to bear in mind here is how, in Michael Kazin’s (1998a: 3) 
words, populist politics are “elastic and promiscuous”: populist ideas about 
grievances, the people and elites can apply to both left-wing and right-wing 
political thought. This is the power and allure of populism—especially for 
grassroots political actors. Rather than articulating a coherent set of political 
ideas and positions like a traditional ideology, populism allows actors to express 
“idealistic discontent” (ibid: 3) with the current practice of democracy and 
verbalise “moralistic… normative distinction[s] between ‘the elite’ and ‘the 
people’ ” (Mudde 2004: 544). Populism gives actors the opportunity to reflect 
and re-interpret a generalised “mood” of angst about “politics as usual” and a 
means by which to disrupt the taken-for-granted ways in which power is 
exercised by both actors and institutions (Canovan 1999: 6).  Because populism 
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does not advance a particular political ideology as such but advocates a different 
process by which democratic politics is conceived and practised, I argue that it 
should be understood as a political strategy for organising and mobilising the 
public. This is why it can be used, with seemingly little difficulty or 
contradiction, by both the right and left in grassroots movements at this 
moment in time in the United States. I will now turn to explore how populism is 
operationalised in the US context. 
Populism is a central concept in US politics; its emphasis on self-rule and 
democratic egalitarianism is part of the mythology of the founding of the United 
States and forms the basis of ideas of “American exceptionalism3“ (Kazin 1998a; 
Lepore 2010; Zernicke 2010). This mixture of populism and patriotism is 
important in this context because these ideas crowd out other ways of building 
solidarity and mobilising ordinary people. Populism displaces various 
revolutionary ideologies because populism is perceived as an inherently 
“American” idea whilst revolutionary political ideas are seen as dangerously 
foreign or even seditious (Kazin 1998b).  Because America has already had its 
revolution for equality and freedom, transformative politics are seen as largely 
irrelevant to the American political tradition because they seek to alter that 
which has already been perfected in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 
Populism does not seek to overturn the basic mechanics of American 
democracy; rather, it attempts to better perfect what has already been laid out 
by the Founding Fathers. As Kazin (1998b: 80) notes: “America is viewed [by 
populists] as an isolated island of civic virtue whose people have to be 
constantly on guard” against efforts to undermine or radically change it by 
unpatriotic elites. Thus populism in US politics should be seen as a conservative 
form of practice. By staying within the bounds of patriotism and by seeking 
legitimacy by appealing to the status quo, populism does not attempt to 
revolutionise society but to preserve and even strengthen various social 
conventions and traditions.  
From this discussion about the constitutive elements of populism, we can see 
how difficult it might be for feminist justice claims to be legitimised within this 
form of grassroots politics. For the purposes of this paper, I define feminist 
justice claims as those ideas and political practices that seek to “end sexist 
oppression” by advancing the political, economic, social and cultural equality 
for different types of women4 (hooks 2000). I argue that generalised appeals to 
“the people” do not appear to recognise differences and inequalities among and                                                         
3 Proponents of American exceptionalism argue that America is a beacon of light and inspiration 
for other nations because it waged a war of independence based on the principles of individual 
liberty and equality. The American Revolution was a unique event in that it combined 
Enlightenment ideas with a revolutionary fervour and this confirms America’s distinctive place 
in human history.  
4 I use the term ‘different types of women’ to signal the fact that ‘women’ are not a homogenous 
group and that considerable inequalities and conflicts exist between women on the basis of 
‘race’, ethnicity, class, sexuality, religion, age and disability (Spelman 1988; Mouffe 1992; 
Emejulu 2011). 
Interface: a journal for and about social movements Article 
Volume 3 (2): 123 - 151 (November 2011)                        Emejulu, Can “the people” be feminists? 
 
  130 
between individuals and groups due to “race”, ethnicity, gender and class, and 
may make it difficult to incorporate feminist analyses or practices. However, 
since women seem to be key actors in both left-wing and right-wing populist 
grassroots politics—both in terms of their leadership and their mass actions—it 
is important to explore in more depth what happens to feminist justice claims 
when they intersect with populist politics. I will first turn to analyse the so-
called “progressive populism” on the left. 
 
Progressive populism and the suppression of  
feminist justice claims 
Progressive populism in the United States traces its roots back to the late 19th 
century when small farmers and artisans in the South and the West organised 
the People’s Party to counter the growing domination of industrialists and large 
landowners (Fisher 1994; Kazin 1998a, 1998b). Small farmers were unable to 
sell their crops at market at a competitive rate and artisans were being deskilled 
by new industrial production techniques. The People’s Party provided a 
platform for “ordinary people” (in this case, mostly white evangelical Christian 
men and women) to articulate their grievances about capitalist elites’ 
destructive impact on their livelihoods and the collusion of political elites that 
allowed this abuse to continue. Simultaneously, Marxist actors and trade 
unionists were also articulating similar critiques about operation of industrial 
capitalism and the immiseration of the urban working classes (Fink 1994; 
Fisher 1994). Throughout the 20th century, left-wing community organising 
actors have used this analysis of economic exploitation and political corruption 
as a strategy for organising and mobilising poor and working class communities 
(Alinsky 1946, 1968; Fisher 1994). These ideas of populism were revived in the 
early 1980s—a time of right-wing retrenchment and the dismantling of the 
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society reforms—as a new way to appeal to majority 
interests within a community and are still used in community organising today 
(for example see Chambers 2003; DeFilippis, Fisher, and Shragge 2009; Atlas 
2010). 
The New Populist neighbourhood movement was not unified; it sprung up in 
different regions across the country and focused on a variety of issues including 
housing, anti-nuclear protests and large-scale job losses due to factory closures 
(Boggs 1983: 344). Perhaps the best known manifestation of new populism is 
the now defunct Association of Community Organisations for Reform Now 
(ACORN) which was a nation-wide network of grassroots groups working on a 
range of issues including voter registration and turnout, redlining and loan 
sharking (Delgado 1986; Fisher 1994; Atlas 2010). Other new populist 
organisations include Public Citizen, Fair Share, the Industrial Areas 
Foundation (IAF) and Communities Organised for Public Service (COPS). Some 
of these organisations, such as the Campaign for Economic Democracy (CED) in 
Santa Monica, California focused on local issues and formal municipal politics 
whilst others such as Fair Share and Public Citizen sought to build regional 
networks for social change (Boggs 1983; Delgado 1986). Despite the significant 
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differences between these organisations, it is possible to identify a progressive 
populist discursive repertoire that unites them, which I will now turn to discuss. 
As Boyte (1980: 7), a key proponent of progressive populism asserts, this new 
neighbourhood movement represents:  
a renewed vision of direct democracy coupled with a mistrust of large 
institutions, both public and private. Such a democratic vision represents a 
rekindled faith in the citizenry itself, a conviction that, given the means and the 
information, people can make decisions about the course of their lives.  
In other words, progressive populism is focused on the decentralisation of 
power to community-based institutions in order to revitalise the practice of 
democracy in the US. It is populist through its insistence that ordinary people 
have the ability and capacity to make decisions about their lives and the “public 
good”.  
The social practices of progressive populism are constructed as:  
cooperative group action by ordinary citizens motivated both by civic idealism 
and by specific grievances…Citizen activism frequently grows directly from 
traditional and particular group identities that leftists tend to see as “backwaters” 
of parochialism—religious and civic traditions, ethnic ties and family relations. In 
the course of struggle, people often feel deepened appreciation for their heritage, 
symbols and institutions close to home—a far cry from the abstract 
cosmopolitanism of the dominant liberal or left imagination (Boyte 1980: 7). 
As I described earlier, populism in the US tends to displace revolutionary 
ideologies because that form of politics critiques and seeks to transform “the 
people”. In contrast, progressive populism constructs traditions and folkways as 
the authentic basis to build real democracy:  
Contemporary citizen organising is more down to earth, more practical, above all 
more enduring and rooted in the social fabric [of community life]. It seeks to 
build ongoing organisations through which people can wield power. It is 
accompanied by a sense of the rightness, creativity and vitality in people’s 
traditions, folkways and culture that 60s radicals were prone to scorn or dismiss 
(Boyte 1980: 139). 
As we can see in the quote above, it is important to note the hostility of 
progressive populism to revolutionary politics. Socialism, feminism and Black 
nationalism all appear to be constructed as elitist because they seek to subvert 
community institutions and traditions. This is crucial to our understanding of 
populism on the left: it not just party political elites and corporate fat cats that 
are challenged—groups advancing an explicitly ideological position about the 
structural nature of social problems and solutions in communities also appear 
to be branded as elitist. 
The structure of the progressive populist discourse hinges on three concepts 
that drive community organising: the idea of “democracy”, a so-called “non-
ideological majoritarian strategy”, and a focus on organisational “victories” 
rather than the political education of grassroots actors.  
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“Democracy” in the progressive populist discourse is understood as “popular 
power—control by the majority of people, with equality of resources sufficient to 
make such control realisable—and of direct participation by freely cooperating 
men and women” (Boyte 1980: 175-6). Democracy is defined as government by 
and for the people—focusing on the self-governing of free citizens in the 
interests of the majority. In order to achieve this ideal of self-government the 
threats to citizen self-rule—elite-dominated institutions—must be limited. As 
Reissman (1986: 54) declares: “large numbers of people feeling submerged and 
overpowered by big institutions and big government are attempting to get some 
control over their lives. They are struggling for empowerment”. 
In order to achieve this notion of empowerment, populist actors practice a so-
called “non-ideological majoritarian strategy”. This strategy focuses on building 
mass-based, multi-class and multi-racial citizen-controlled organisations that 
are rooted in neighbourhoods, focused on local issues and targeted on winnable 
issues (Boyte 1980; Delgado 1986; Fisher 1994). “If we are to successfully 
challenge concentrated wealth and power, we need to begin by building and 
strengthening autonomous organisations and institutions that are deeply rooted 
in the experiences and values of people in local communities” (Miller 1986: 
132). This strategy is non-ideological because the organisations are built and 
issues are identified and campaigned on based on the “authentic” interests and 
concerns of citizens rather than organisers’ or outsiders’ ideological 
interpretations of community-based problems and solutions. “Our philosophy is 
very closely related to our membership’s daily life experience. There’s no 
ideology that instructs what we do. People make decisions and they start 
moving” (Rathke 1979 quoted in Delgado 1986: 190-1). 
The strategy is majoritarian because the community organisation is composed 
of a broad-based constituency which is multi-class and multi-racial and issues 
are fought for which have broad-based appeal in the neighbourhood. In a 
contemporary account of progressive populism, Scanlon (2001: 62) argues:  “we 
must choose policy priorities that address the most prevalent economic 
concerns of US citizens…we must prioritise those policies…which could 
potentially unify poor, working and middle class citizens”. This non-ideological 
majoritarian strategy ensures that social problems identified by community 
organising are always framed in terms of the powerful—government and 
corporations—against the powerless—the (unified and homogenised) people. 
Potentially divisive issues—especially those related to race and gender—are not 
pursued because it would compromise the unity and consensus of the 
organisation. Only issues with a clearly defined enemy and a clear path to 
success are defined as viable for mobilising and campaigning. As Mike Miller, 
(1973, quoted in Boyte 1980: 93), a central practitioner of new populism, notes, 
“grassroots groups must overcome the divide-and-conquer tactics of the 
powerful; middle-income people are potential allies, not adversaries; tactics 
should not alienate the public”.  
It seems that by seeking to build a majority to advocate for a particular 
community issue requires a broad-based definition of democracy and active 
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avoidance of elitist ideological domination. Importantly, by supporting the 
issues and concerns of a numerical majority, this may well lead to an 
affirmation of the status quo and a marginalisation of issues that challenge 
established community traditions that reproduce inequalities between different 
groups. 
The final concept of the progressive populist discourse is “victory” which is 
constructed in two ways. Firstly, building and maintaining a citizen-controlled 
organisation becomes its own victory for local people—a perpetual self-
justification for the process of organising. “This idea of being organised in a 
constituency-based organisation… is more important than the particular issue 
we work on. Again, we might lose or we might win and still the need to be 
organised remains” (Campbell 1979 quoted in Delgado 1986: 202). A permanent 
organisation, composed of activists ready to react to abuses of power by the 
state or corporations and who can also advance their own self-interest, is 
constructed as the most effective kind of power people can wield. Secondly, 
targeting winnable issues, with a clear enemy and a clear campaign strategy, 
builds the confidence of citizens and re-enforces the need for a permanent 
organisation. “An expansion of income transfers and remunerations for 
domestic labour are not viable policy proposals… populists… must help US 
families to understand their shared interests in policies that reduce threats to 
the well-being of all workers” (Scanlon 2001: 66). People will join and actively 
participate in an organisation that is perceived to be powerful, formidable and 
effective. 
In terms of identity constructions, the progressive populist sense of self is 
constituted by the way in which it defines “the people”. The people are all the 
same: they are civic-minded, they share the same interests and they are not in 
conflict with each other over power and resources at the grassroots level. As 
Wade Rathe (1975 quoted in Fisher 1994, p.148), the former chief organiser for 
ACORN reflects, “I wanted to build on a majority constituency rather than on a 
minority, where the next-door neighbours are in it together, not fighting each 
other”. Ultimately, “the people” are reified through the way in which traditions, 
folkways and community-based institutions are fetishised in the discourse: 
Populism…grows from the living fabric of communities seeking to control the 
forces that threaten to overwhelm them. Populism…is ultimately about values 
and cultural meanings. Rather than drawing its base from large organisations…in 
which people are cut off from their family roots and communal ties, populist 
politics finds its power and vision in the institutions integral to social life: 
churches, synagogues, neighbourhood organisations, union locals (Boyte 1985:1). 
By defining everyone as the same and by emphasising the essential goodness 
and unproblematic nature of community structures, these constructions aim to 
make it easier to build solidarity and organise competing groups for collective 
action. The problem, however, is that the very real conflicts, contradictions and 
interests between different groups are ignored for the sake of organisation 
building. This appears to have the effect of closing down other possible 
identities—especially feminist consciousness and feminist identities. 
Interface: a journal for and about social movements Article 
Volume 3 (2): 123 - 151 (November 2011)                        Emejulu, Can “the people” be feminists? 
 
  134 
Controversial issues are avoided or reframed to make them palpable to the 
majority interests and as a result, crucial minority issues may well be silenced.  
Three types of elites represent the other in the progressive populist discourse: 
government, corporate and revolutionary. As I have demonstrated throughout 
the previous discussion of the New Populism movement, not a lot of distinction 
is made between these three very different types of elites because the discourse 
constructs them as having the same harmful impact: undermining the self-
determination of the people. Whether it is domination through corporate power, 
through the centralisation of state power or through “ideological” language and 
ideas, all elites prevent the people from making decisions on issues that are 
important to them. As Fisher (1994, p.139) argues, “unchecked power has 
become concentrated in the hands of a very small number of people who are at 
the helm of the major corporations of the nation. Because government remains 
unaccountable to most people, it too, along with business is part of the 
problem”. Whilst Boyte (1980, p.9), argues that:  
the left can neither understand nor successfully participate in the citizen ferment 
[of New Populism] if it sees [community] groups instrumentally—as 
constituencies to be rallied behind a left or “progressive” agenda… Dialogue that 
reshapes left categories means recovering activist traditions outside the liberal, 
socialist, or communist experience. 
Homogenising the idea of the people combined with the othering of 
revolutionary political elites means that, unsurprisingly, feminist justice claims 
appear to be silenced within the progressive populist discourse. I want to take a 
closer look at how this marginalisation takes place as this may form the basis by 
which feminist organising and claim-making can better challenge dominant 
practices of community organising.  Firstly, feminist justice claims are silenced 
and gender consciousness is suppressed by the progressive populist discourse 
through the systematic marginalisation of women’s interests and experiences. 
In practice, we can see how this takes place in many community organisations 
during the 1980s.  
In a pioneering article about women community organisers, Cheryl Hyde 
interviewed a range of women activists to discuss their views of working in 
male-dominated organisations. One activist notes: “It’s the men…that disrupt 
[our peace affinity group] because they don’t have a sense of what collective 
work is…[and] they’re not comfortable with having [a woman] who is trying to 
help everyone manage their feelings and their conflict” (Woman activist quoted 
in Hyde 1985: 81). In a similar vein, the Women Organizers’ Collective (1990: 
12) argues, “we are trained to be organisers in what is largely taken to be a 
gender-neutral model. But, as is usually the case, this “neutral” model is not 
neutral at all, because by claiming gender blindness it ignores issues and 
concerns specific to women”. 
On a related note, Adamson (1980 quoted in Delgado 1986: 195-6) discusses the 
impact of silencing both race and gender in the new neighbourhood movement 
organisations: 
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For young Blacks, if you want to get into what’s happening in your community, an 
ACORN or a Fair Share is not the place to do it… The organisations are 
inadvertently racist… What they do is they treat everybody the same way. If you 
don’t take into account the fact that there are real differences culturally, you’re 
going to have problems… The hierarchy [of these organisations] is reflective of 
essentially what society is; it’s all white and mostly male. 
From the quotes above, we can see how the progressive populist discursive 
practice of constructing “the people” as unified and homogenous appears to 
suppress gender identity and feminist justice claims. The systematic way in 
which the discourse silences gender is one of the main reasons for the 
development of explicitly feminist community organisations during the 1980s 
and 1990s (Hyde 1985; Ackelsberg 1988; Bookman and Martin 1988; Women 
Organizers’ Collective 1990; Stall and Stoecker 1997).  
Secondly, we can see how the deployment of the notion of authenticity in the 
progressive populism discourse seeks to silence feminist justice claims. For 
example, feminist arguments such as this from Ansara and Miller (1986: 154-5) 
pose, I think, irresolvable problems for the discourse of progressive populism:  
Important ethnic, racial, class and cultural differences divide “the people”… The 
new populism of community organisations has not developed either an 
intellectual breadth or a strategic clarity that would create conditions for a 
broader appeal to the constituencies that are at the heart of the women’s… 
movement.  
Because feminism seeks to transform the relationships, identities and values 
associated with “women” and “men” this is constructed by the progressive 
populist discourse as a “special interest” that will split and undermine populists’ 
hard won work of building the unity and solidarity of the people. Sawer (2004: 
13), exploring the fate of state feminism in Canada, argues that populist politics 
reconstruct feminist justice claims from a “public good” to a “special interest” by 
severing the link between feminist justice claims and redistributive justice 
claims: “Doubt was being cast on the authenticity of such [feminist] goals and 
on the interests and motives of their proponents… [Feminist groups] were no 
longer regarded as having an authentic democratic role… but rather were 
depicted as self-interested and unrepresentative special interests”.  
Within the discursive landscape of progressive populism, we can see similar 
processes at work: feminist justice claims are constructed as incapable of 
advancing the people’s authentic interests because it only speaks to and 
supports “special pleaders”. Scanlon (2001: 64) argues that rejecting feminist 
and anti-racist justice claims makes good sense strategically because these ideas 
have very little popular support; it is reasonable to focus only on authentic 
issues that will unify a majority: “It is increasingly clear that policies targeted to 
address racial and gender injustices have insufficient potential to animate a 
broad-based movement for economic justice… race and gender based policies 
cannot unify the bottom two-thirds of the US population”.  
The author goes on to argue that feminist and anti-racist struggles are 
counterproductive for the left because they alienate potential allies. Better, he 
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argues, to focus instead on a “working families” agenda that “could allow us to 
use a unifying language about… the fortunes of common people” (ibid: 64). 
Because women and minority groups would disproportionately benefit from 
measures to reduce economic inequality, it is sound politics to jettison ideas and 
identities that might put this strategy at risk. Furthermore, since most 
Americans “simultaneously yet rationally hold substantial economic populist 
sentiments and conservative beliefs…[it] may not be necessary to educate or 
enlighten many… Americans before speaking to their basic class interests” 
(Martin 2010: 374).  Again, in terms of strategy and reflecting the authentic 
views of the people, from a progressive populist standpoint, it seems a folly to 
unnecessarily antagonise potential allies by focusing on issues that might 
alienate them from the cause of social justice.  
From the quotations above, we can see how feminism (and anti-racism) are 
constructed as “divisive”, “political” and/or “partisan” whilst populism is 
constituted as “unifying”, “strategic” and “viable”. Progressive populism, in its 
attempt to build a majority, appears to systematically displace and marginalise 
identities and practices—especially those related to the development of gender 
consciousness, feminist policy preferences and feminist justice claims.  
To understand this self-censorship by progressive populism we need to recall 
how populist politics in the US context is seeking to interpellate patriotic ideals. 
It seems that as long as progressive populism seeks its legitimacy and 
authenticity in American exceptionalism rather than in transformative social 
justice ideas, it will continue to suppress gender consciousness and feminist 
practices in urban movements.  
I will now turn to analyse the discourse, identities and social practices of the Tea 
Party and explore the fate of feminist justice claims within this right-wing 
discursive repertoire. 
 
The women of the Tea Party: motherhood as anti-feminism 
The Tea Party positions itself as the heir to the populist politics of Barry 
Goldwater in the 1960s and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s.  During the 1964 
Presidential race, Goldwater, a Republican, campaigned as an anti-communist, 
a free-marketeer and above all, an angry man tired of the tyranny of state over 
the lives of ordinary people. Here is Goldwater (1964, p.1-2) summarising his 
political philosophy:  
It is the cause of Republicanism to ensure that power remains in the hands of the 
people… We Republicans… define government's role where needed at many, 
many levels, preferably through the one closest to the people involved. Our towns 
and our cities, then our counties, then our states, then our regional contacts - and 
only then, the national government. That, let me remind you, is the ladder of 
liberty, built by decentralised power.  
Goldwater’s failed campaign for the presidency articulated a different emphasis 
on the role of the state which contrasted with the dominant model used during 
the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations in the 1960s. Rather than the state 
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being defined as “activist” whereby its role is to intervene in the lives of citizens 
in order to ensure equality of opportunity and (to a lesser extent in the US 
context) equality of outcome, Goldwater defines the state in a much more 
limited way. The state’s responsibility is simply to maintain the societal status 
quo in terms of morality and class, racial and gender hierarchies (Klatch 1988; 
Diamond 1995). This populist backlash against the social reforms of both the 
New Deal and Great Society programmes captured the imagination of a 
burgeoning grassroots right-wing movement (Fisher 1994; McGirr 2002; 
Lassiter 2007). 
When Reagan (1981, p.1-2) comes to power in 1981, he echoes Goldwater’s 
populist ideas and places them at the heart of his Administration: 
We suffer from the longest and one of the worst sustained inflations in our 
national history… In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our 
problem; government is the problem. From time to time we've been tempted to 
believe that society has become too complex to be managed by self-rule, that 
government by an elite group is superior to government for, by, and of the people. 
Well, if no one among us is capable of governing himself, then who among us has 
the capacity to govern someone else? 
The Tea Party is organised and mobilised in relation to the banking crisis of 
2008 and the subsequent ballooning of national debt (Lepore 2010; Lilla 2010; 
Zernicke 2010).  In order to prevent the meltdown of global capitalism, George 
W. Bush and then Barack Obama bailed out the financial services industry, large 
mortgage providers such as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae and the auto industry, 
most notably General Motors through the Troubled Asset Relief Programme 
(TARP) (Lanchester 2010). In addition, Obama and the Federal Reserve 
instituted a “stimulus” to the economy by pumping new money into banks and 
infrastructure projects in order to stabilise the market, support job creation and 
prompt banks to start lending again to businesses. The almost total collapse of 
the American economy and the subsequent efforts to prevent another Great 
Depression by increasing government spending to bail out the banks was a 
salient political moment that sparked the initial Tea Party mobilisation (Lepore 
2010; Zernicke 2010). Importantly, Obama’s continuation with his other 
domestic priorities, especially healthcare reform, also galvanised right-wing 
grassroots actors.  
I label the discourse of the Tea Party as “regressive populism” as its goals are 
concerned with limiting government intervention in the lives of Americans. 
Zernike (2010: 2) summarises the aims of the Tea Party as organising for “less 
invasive government, lower taxes, [and] fealty to the view of the nation the 
founders enshrined in the Constitution”. It is important, however, to note that 
the “Tea Party” is not a unified movement. It is constituted by a number of local 
and regional groups and has no centralised leadership (ibid: 2010). Certainly, 
organisations such as FreedomWorks, the Tea Party Patriots and the Tea Party 
Express and Republican politicians and commentators such as Michele 
Bachmann, Sarah Palin and Jim DeMint are all seeking legitimacy to speak for 
and direct Tea Party activities, but, at this moment in time, no one national 
organisation or identifiable leader has emerged to corral this disparate group of 
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actors. Regressive populism’s social practices are two pronged: organising and 
mobilising networked community organisations to challenge elite domination in 
government and transforming the Republican Party to make it more reflective 
of the authentic will of the people.  
The regressive populist discourse is structured by one key idea: a return to the 
first principles of the Founding Fathers. The Founding Fathers—George 
Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, John Adams, Benjamin 
Franklin and a number of others—are used as a proxy by the discourse to 
interpellate two inter-related ideas related to retrenchment. Firstly, looking 
back to the Founding Fathers is a discursive device to build solidarity among 
Tea Partiers by uniting grassroots actors, rather paradoxically, under a banner 
of radical individual autonomy. The Founders, regressive populists argue, 
conceived of America as a place of unfettered freedom whereby individuals 
could pursue happiness unconstrained by an overweening state. Regressive 
populism:  
fires up emotions by appealing to individual opinion, individual autonomy, and 
individual choice, all in the service of neutralizing, not using, political power. It 
gives voice to those who feel they are being bullied, but this voice has only one, 
Garbo-like thing to say: I want to be left alone (Lilla 2010: 2). 
Liberty for regressive populism means a focus on negative rights—the right of 
citizens not to be interfered with in getting on in life by other citizens or by the 
state (Diamond 1995: 6-9). In interviewing a number of Tea Partiers across the 
country, Zernicke (2010: 10) found that “they had a visceral belief that 
government had taken control of their lives—and they wanted it back… They 
had a strong faith in the autonomous individual”.  For regressive populism, 
“real” autonomy can only be guaranteed by a limited state.  
This notion of autonomy is important as this helps to shed light on the second 
idea that is interpellated by the promotion of the Founding Fathers: laissez-faire 
capitalism. It seems strange that in light of capitalism’s self-evident destructive 
activities in the financial sector and its negative effect on the economic well-
being of the American public that regressive populism adopts this concept. 
However, because the guiding principle of the discourse is a libertarian view of 
negative liberty, this form of autonomy can only be achieved through the 
practice of free-market capitalism. Capitalism is the symbol and safeguard of 
negative liberty because it is only in an environment of a decentralised state and 
a free market that individuals can be radically free to pursue happiness. “Free 
markets just needed room to work… it was the American people, not the elites in 
Washington, who knew how to confront the [financial] crisis” (Zernicke 2010: 
24). Since the state has been captured and is controlled by self-interested 
elites—both unrepresentative party political hacks and bureaucratic “pointy-
headed” social reformers—the state cannot be trusted to protect liberty. The 
state is fatally compromised and corrupted. Only the free market, which is 
ideologically free from elite interference, can guarantee individuals the 
opportunity to practice freedom.  
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These structuring devices of the discourse orientate its social practices in terms 
of community organising. What is interesting to note is how the social practices 
of the discourse mirror those of the progressive populism. As I discussed earlier, 
since the Tea Party self-consciously models its community organising work on 
progressive populism, we see two movements, using similar ideas of populism, 
similar strategies for organising but mobilising actors for divergent goals. For 
instance, the elite Washington-based organisation, FreedomWorks, which is 
seeking to capture and direct the disparate groups which all identify with the 
aims of the Tea Party, discusses strategies for organising the movement like 
this: 
Don’t reject that label [of community organiser]! Embrace that label… true 
community organisers are what this movement is all made of. We don’t like that 
term because now we have a Community Organiser-in-Chief [referring to Barack 
Obama who worked as an organiser in Chicago in the 1980s] who got his lessons 
from Saul Alinsky. I say, let’s read Saul Alinsky… and let’s use it against them 
(Steinhauser quoted in Zernicke 2010: 3). 
With this explicit adoption of progressive populist practices, regressive 
populism also uses a majoritarian strategy to unite “the people” and to avoid 
unnecessary alienation of potential allies.  Again, FreedomWorks argues that 
activists should avoid discussing social issues (especially abortion and gay 
marriage) and stay focused on arguments for a limited state and individual 
autonomy: “It’s going to split this movement, it’s going to distract us… The debt 
is $13billion. Why would you focus on gay marriage when that’s the real threat 
to freedom—the debt?” (Steinhauser quoted in Zernicke 2010: 42). 
Regressive populism also directs its community organising work towards 
infiltrating and co-opting the Republican Party to force out so-called 
Republicans in Name Only (RINOs) to ensure that the Party reflects the 
authentic interests of the people.  This practice of co-optation takes on two 
forms: primary challenges and transforming local party leadership. Sometimes 
grassroots actors target centre-right elected officials who are deemed to be 
ideologically compromised by serving elite interests in Washington rather than 
the will of their constituents5. A primary challenge is instituted when a Tea 
Party candidate enters a local race in an attempt to displace the incumbent and 
win the nomination as the Republican candidate. Other times, grassroots actors 
are organised to infiltrate the Republican party “from below” by running as local 
party officials and thus attempting to change the nature of the Party from the 
inside (Zernicke 2010). 
Although regressive and progressive populism share similar social practices, in 
terms of identity constructions, regressive populism is noteworthy—especially 
in terms of gender consciousness and identity (Klatch 1988; Jetter, Orleck and 
Taylor 1997; Blee 1998). In the discourse, the idea of the self is constituted in                                                         
5 For an excellent exploration of how the Tea Party uses primary challenges to pressurise the 
Republican Party to change, see the This American Life (29th October 2010) episode entitled: 
“This Party Sucks” http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/417/this-party-
sucks  
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two ways. Similar to progressive populism, the self is constructed as the 
“authentic people”. Within regressive populism, the idea of the people is 
typically supplemented by appeals to the normalcy of actors involved in the 
movement:  
I don’t think people understand how normal these folks are and how diversified. 
You’ve got evangelicals and libertarians walking hand-in hand in cause of defence 
of individual liberties, against encroachments of big government… These folks are 
as normal as you and me. It could be your mother, your father (Armey 2010 
quoted in Zernicke 2010: 44). 
I suspect that one of the reasons the discourse deploys authenticity and 
constructs its subjects as “normal” and “real” Americans is to justify why the 
membership and the leadership of the various Tea Partier groups is highly 
unrepresentative of the American population. Unlike progressive populism, 
which was seeking to unite middle and working class Americans of all 
backgrounds, the Tea Party appears to be dominated by white, educated, middle 
to upper class men and women who hold far-right views6 (Zernicke 2010; 
Parker 2011). The discursive pattern in regressive populism repeats the tropes 
of “real America” and “real Americans” as a way to legitimise the interests and 
social practices of a very narrow group of Americans as the true voice 
representing of all Americans.   
This narrow group of actors taking on the identity of “real Americans”, however, 
appears to be led by women and unlike in the progressive populist discourse, 
these women seem to articulate a clear gender identity and a right-wing gender 
consciousness. Importantly, these women appear to have found space within the 
Tea Party to organise as women. Here are a few examples of these expressions: 
You know the old saying that if mama ain’t happy, ain’t nobody happy… Well, 
when legislation messes with mama’s kids and it affects her family, then mama 
comes out fighting  (Dawald  2010 quoted in Vogel 2010: 2). 
Women can be stay-at-home moms and public servants… This isn’t about gearing 
“conservative” towards women and separating the movement. It’s not about 
changing the [Republican] party to suit the identity. It’s about reaching out to 
people like you. (Mott 2011 quoted in Hess 2011: 3). 
Barack Obama’s fatal mistake was that he came between me and my child’s future 
(Stefano 2010 quoted in Zernicke 2010b: 108). 
From the language used above, we can see how some women use their identity 
as mothers to make sense of their activism within the Tea Party. In keeping with 
the regressive ideas of this discourse, it is not surprising that some women find 
a seemingly stereotypical idea of “concerned motherhood” as a valuable way of 
informing their community organising work. Indeed, it seems that the discourse 
creates space for these types of identities to be generated in order to legitimise                                                         
6 Trying to understand who Tea Partiers are is a highly contested topic. However, Zernicke 
(2010), through a New York Times poll and Parker (2011), through a multi-state survey do 
appear to document that middle to higher income whites holding far-right views are over-
represented in the Tea Party whilst various minority groups of any political persuasion are 
vastly under-represented. 
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its credentials as an authentic expression of the people. Having women identify 
as mothers fighting for their families’ futures further deepens the populist 
claims of the discourse. 
The other is constructed, unsurprisingly, as cultural and political elites. 
Ironically, economic elites are not challenged or displaced. It is both the 
Democratic and Republican Parties and the entrenched liberal elite in the 
mainstream media and in government bureaucracies that are othered in this 
discourse. For example, this activist is discussing why she was attracted to the 
Tea Party and why she started organising: “It was [composed of] very motivated 
people, people like me… They hadn’t spend a lifetime being politicians; they 
didn’t go to the Kennedy School of Government [at Harvard University], they 
didn’t work as a staffer on Capitol Hill” (Stefano 2010 quoted in Zernicke 
2010a: 1). As we can see, politicians, east coast liberals and political insiders are 
all othered by being constructed as inauthentic and incapable of serving the will 
of the people. 
The question remains, however, why regressive populism creates space for at 
two ideas of the self—the people and concerned mothers—whilst the progressive 
populist discourse suppresses gender identity and consciousness. Klatch (1988) 
and Schreiber (2010) argue that, for social conservatives, motherhood is a key 
identity and institution through which to defend traditional moral values. The 
way in which regressive populism constitutes this particular identity of 
concerned mothers also seems to corroborate Zernicke’s (2010) and Parker’s 
(2011) findings about the reactionary views of many Tea Partiers. As I noted 
earlier, this phenomenon of self-censorship on the left can be partly explained 
by populism’s patriotic roots in the US. Left-wing populists have to work harder 
to prove their pro-American credentials. Some progressive appear to be haunted 
by the “extreme” rhetoric of 1960s social movements and do not want be 
labelled as radical as this might derail their political aims. Therefore progressive 
populism highlights victories of “the people” over broader analyses of systemic 
change. 
However, regressive populism is employing some interesting discursive 
methods with regards to women in activism and this needs to be explored in 
further detail. In order to prompt some women into action, the discourse needs 
to appeal to an essentialised identity that many women deeply value—
motherhood. Rather than interpret what Nancy Naples (1992) calls “activist 
mothering” as solely a progressive activity, it is important to define conservative 
women’s social practices that seek to preserve traditional social relations and 
reduce the role of the state in the lives of women and their families as activist 
mothering as well (for an interesting discussion of this which focuses on elite 
right-wing women’s social practices see: Schreiber 2002 and 2008). Women’s 
Tea Party organising seems to generate a gender identity, consciousness and a 
sense of efficacy which influences their policy preferences.  
Although she is discussing left-wing women, Sue Tolleson-Rinehart’s (1992: 31) 
analysis of gender consciousness appears to perfectly describe the conservative 
women of the Tea Party: “[Gender] consciousness beyond stimulating women’s 
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beliefs about their own political roles, also reorganises orientations toward 
other issues by motivating women to believe that they have unique perspectives 
on public problems and can offer unique solutions”. Indeed, when Sarah Palin 
discusses her idea of “Mama Grizzlies” she is attempting to channel a tough-
minded identity of motherhood that seeks to mobilise women for political action 
based on their unique perspectives as women and mothers. By adopting the role 
of activist mothers, some women actors in the Tea Party seem to be infused with 
a sense of efficacy and work towards issues that are important to them and their 
families.  
The question remains, however, whether identifying as women and mothers is 
sufficient for generating a feminist perspective and articulating feminist justice 
claims within the populist discourse of the Tea Party. Tellingly, the policy 
preferences of the Tea Party—the rolling back of the state and the unleashing of 
free-market capitalism—are not compatible with a feminist vision of equality 
and social justice. What we appear to be seeing in the Tea Party is a familiar and 
constrained performance of gender in right-wing politics (Klatch 1988; Jetter, 
Orleck and Taylor 1997; Blee 1998). Rather than generating feminist identities 
and justice claims, a traditional, moralistic and highly problematic identity of 
“activist mother” is constituted whereby “mothers’ activism may indeed 
(temporarily) expand the base of political participation but with the goal of 
limiting citizenship and constraining democracy (Ackelsberg 2001: 406, 
emphasis in the original text). Women identifying as women and entering 
public space to be activists in the Tea Party is not necessarily a positive process 
that will strengthen feminism or support democratic politics since these women 
appear to be advocating for policies that would reduce the equality for all 
citizens through the dismantling of key state institutions and social protection 
systems. A gender identity of concerned motherhood is not enough to generate 
feminist justice claims by these right-wing women in action. 
From my analysis we can see how populism in both left-wing and right-wing 
community organising silences feminist justice claims and makes it difficult for 
women to develop a feminist identity that might orientate their actions towards 
radical social change. In my final section I will turn to discuss whether, in spite 
of the contradictions between feminism and populism, these two discourses can 
somehow be reconciled. 
 
The possibilities for reconciling populism and feminism 
It is unsurprising to discover how populist community organising discourses 
and practices suppress feminist justice claims. Because populist actors are 
concerned with voicing multi-issue grievances about the actions of elites, the 
discourse of populism is not really designed or equipped to accommodate a 
sophisticated construction of “the people”. That the public feel they are being 
shut out of their democracy, being bossed around, disrespected and 
economically exploited by selfish elites is sufficient enough to motivate people 
Interface: a journal for and about social movements Article 
Volume 3 (2): 123 - 151 (November 2011)                        Emejulu, Can “the people” be feminists? 
 
  143 
into action. Feminist politics, of course, make complimentary critiques about 
the problems that plague liberal democracies. As Minnich (1986: 191) argues: 
A feminist vision of populism shares… a commitment to the rights of all people and an 
insistence that these rights are not to be set aside in the interests of any power group. We, 
too, insist that those governments are legitimate that derive their power from the people… 
We, too, insist that significant disparities of power in society disrupt the polity and so take 
our stand with those who lack power is not just a personal problem but a threat to the 
commonwealth. 
Given this shared critique, the question remains whether populism and 
feminism can be reconciled. On the one hand, it is clear that these two 
perspectives are incompatible with each other. Populism derives its persuasive 
power from its ability to unite a diverse group of people under a single banner of 
grievance against elites. In hegemonic discourses of populism, anything that 
unnecessarily problematises this unity (in this case, feminism) must be silenced 
as this weakens the movement for change as solidarity will be compromised. 
This is why acknowledging power imbalances between people or advocating for 
specific policy solutions that disproportionately benefit a single group are 
marginalised.  
Populism is a utopian “politics of faith” in the promise of democratic renewal 
(Canovan 1999, 2004; Arditi 2004). In the US, during this moment in time, 
there exists a yawning gap between the promise of democracy and what is 
actually delivered by elites and institutions. Populism, both progressive and 
regressive, brings into focus the democratic deficit that a significant number of 
Americans experience. As Arditi (2004:142) argues, populism haunts liberal 
democracy like a spectre “disturbing and renewing the political process”. Thus it 
seems that populism and feminism cannot be reconciled because populism is 
not interested in the political, social and cultural concerns of feminism. 
Populism is the flipside to the operation of politics as usual. It is focused only on 
re-linking the ideal of democracy to its actual existing practices.  This is why 
populism haunts democracy: it is always fluttering on the edges the democratic 
machinery of the state ready to strike when machinery of parties, politicians and 
bureaucracies become self-serving. 
On the other hand, several left-wing community organising theorists argue that 
populism and feminism (and other identity-based movements) can co-exist. 
Rather than construct progressive populism as solely a practice of redistributive 
justice, these authors claim that populism can be reconstructed into something 
they call “transformative populism” (Kennedy, Tilly and Gaston 1990; Kleidman 
2004). “Transformative populism [insists] on understanding and valuing 
diversity and on dealing with all kinds of inequality and injustice and not just 
the one type that affects the largest number of people in a community…[It 
builds] popular consciousness that makes it more difficult to shatter or co-opt 
the coalition” (Kennedy, Tilly and Gaston 1990: 319).  
For transformative populists, community organising is constructed as a process 
by which to support forms of solidarity that encourage an organised and 
democratic left-wing voice that speaks to the discrete interests and the common 
private troubles of different groups. By building alliances based on difference, 
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this form of populism is constructing ways in which a diverse range of 
individuals and groups can struggle together for expanded social, political and 
economic rights. Ultimately, transformative populism is characterised as a way 
in which community-based problems can be linked to and explained by the 
social, political and economic structures of American society that reproduce 
inequalities.  
While this way of reconciling populism with feminism is persuasive in theory, I 
am not convinced about how effective it is in the practice of displacing 
hegemonic forms of populism within left-wing community organising 
movements. Indeed, as I have demonstrated earlier in this article, progressive 
populism’s dominant practices of suppressing difference—especially feminist 
claims—are well documented (Sen 2001; Martin 2002; Leavitt 2003).  Based on 
my analysis of texts, I do not think it is possible for feminism and progressive 
populism to be reconciled without feminist justice claims being set aside for the 
sake of “solidarity”. The logic of populism demands homogeneity and unity 
among “the people”—this appears to me to be an irreconcilable difference with 
the feminist project of expanding the idea of politics and political subjects in 
order to achieve equality and justice for women. 
When we consider right-wing populism, the logic of populism continues to pose 
irresolvable problems for feminism but for different and perhaps more 
dangerous reasons. The regressive populism of the Tea Party appears to create 
space for women to adopt a gender identity and develop a form of gender 
consciousness. However, this identity of “activist mother”, whilst providing 
meaning for some women’s actions in public space, is deeply problematic. As 
Orleck (1997: 5) argues, right-wing activist mothers are not necessarily acting 
from positions of liberation:  “The institution of motherhood… regulates 
acceptable behaviour, restricts expression and designates appropriate spaces for 
action… It is against the nexus of power relations that mother-activism must be 
assessed”. Activism to maintain hegemonic gender roles and gender-based 
oppression may well promote efficaciousness but this form of activism should 
not be confused with social justice practices that seek to transform what we 
think is possible for women and men. Women organising as women is not 
necessarily feminist and as feminist actors we must guard against our language 
and practices being co-opted to legitimise anti-feminist and illiberal activism.  
 
Conclusions 
Populist politics are about articulating grievances, building solidarity among 
“the people” and challenging political, economic and cultural elites. Populist 
actors promote the concept of “authenticity” to movement outsiders, potential 
allies and to elites in order to legitimate their actions and transform the 
dominant practice of power in democratic regimes. Populism in the United 
States typically displaces revolutionary ideologies because populism is strongly 
associated with the founding myths of the nation in terms of individual liberty 
and the pursuit of happiness.  At this moment in time in the US, community 
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organising groups on both the left and the right are using populism as a way to 
mobilise local people and influence the policy outcomes at the local, state, 
national and international levels. In this article I explored how both left-wing 
and in right-wing populist discourses—in different ways and for different 
reasons—marginalise and silence feminist justice claims.  
I analysed how left-wing progressive populist actors, concerned with being 
perceived as patriotic by outsiders, actively undermined and silenced feminist 
claims. The progressive populist discourse promotes gender neutrality in 
community organisations to marginalise women who seek to identify as women 
whilst at the same time operationalising a politics of authenticity to reconstruct 
feminist claims from “social justice” to “special interest” thus labelling feminism 
as an unrepresentative expression of elite partisan interests. This silencing of 
feminism was justified in terms of strategy: because feminist ideas cannot 
muster a majority in a given neighbourhood, it must be jettisoned for ideas and 
policies that can deliver a numerical majority to the movement.  
In contrast, I also analysed how a right-wing regressive populist discourse as 
operationalised by the Tea Party used claims about motherhood to mobilise a 
constituency for action. Drawing on a rich mix libertarian ideas of radical 
personal autonomy whilst also borrowing organising strategies from progressive 
populism, this discourse seeks to reverse the New Deal and Great Society 
reforms by reducing the role of the state in lives of individual Americans. I 
examined how some women in the Tea Party, spurred on by the language of 
retrenchment, seemed to articulate a gender identity to make sense of their 
grassroots activism. Due to the development of a right-wing gender identity 
which limited women’s ideas about themselves and their social role to 
traditional notions of motherhood, I argued that women in the Tea Party may 
well be undermining feminism and democracy through policy preferences that 
seek to reduce the equality of all citizens.  Feminists working at the grassroots 
should be deeply suspicious of populist claims and practices for the organisation 
and mobilisation of different groups, since, based on my analysis, this appears 
to necessitate the displacement of feminist identities and justice claims in order 
to effectively constitute “the people” against “the elites”. 
Canovan (1999) discusses how democracy has two faces: one of faith and one of 
pragmatism. Populism, like feminism, can be understood as a politics of faith as 
it is demanding a transformation in the operation and practice of democracy 
through the redistribution of political, economic and cultural power from the 
few to the many. However, populism’s construction of a fictitious people render 
its politics highly dangerous to the very democracy it is seeks to fortify because 
it denies the indispensable ingredient that gives democracy meaning: pluralism. 
By ignoring difference, populism cannot bring the promise of democracy into 
being—the process of different citizens encountering and deliberating with each 
other in public space to collectively identify problems and make just decisions.   
Although much agonised over and debated, contemporary feminisms (and other 
politics of difference movements) do seek to make democracy meaningful by 
creating spaces, opportunities and processes for the articulation of different 
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social perspectives and collective decision-making about the nature of justice. 
As we move into a winter of discontent, populist movements are sweeping the 
globe and have, as they are designed to do, captured the imagination and drawn 
many people into protests in which they might not have otherwise participated. 
From the Arab Spring to Occupy Wall Street to los indignados to the alarming 
rise of the far-right in Europe, populist politics are on the upsurge. Feminist 
activists should be deeply sceptical and on-guard about these populist 
movements because if “the people” are invoked in ways that deny the plurality 
of various social experiences and perspectives for the sake of a mistaken belief 
in or cynical promotion of an abstract ideal of “unity” then feminists may well 
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